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Abstract 
Feminist and postcolonial scholars have long argued that the home was a microcosm and a symbol of 
the colony. To exercise power in the home, to practice domestic mastery over colonised servants, was an 
expression of colonial power. At the same time, intimate contact and domestic conflicts between non-
white servants and their employers had the potential to destabilise hierarchical distinctions, thereby 
threatening the stability of colonial rule. As Ann Laura Stoler puts it, the home was a site where "racial 
classifications were defined and defied" and where relations between coloniser and colonised could 
sustain or challenge colonial rule. The vast majority of the literature on the colonial home focuses on 
European homes and the domestic service relationship as one between a white master/mistress and a 
native servant. The 2007 special issue of Frontiers, for example, focuses on white-"native" encounters. 
Yet, in many colonial contexts, Asian and Indigenous elites employed domestic servants in their homes. 
As Swapna Banerjee has shown in her study of Bengal in British India, the relationship of "subordination" 
in colonial societies was not unique to "white masters/mistresses and native/black servants" but crossed 
class and ethnic lines. 
This paper rethinks understandings of colonial power and intimacy by analysing domestic service in 
Chinese homes in the neighbouring tropical British colonies of Singapore, in the Straits Settlements, and 
Darwin, in Australia's Northern Territory, from the 1910s to the 1930s. A comparison of this sort might, at 
first glance, seem implausible. Singapore was an exploitation colony where the aim was to extract labour 
and produce. Darwin, on the other hand, was part of a settler colony where the intended outcome of 
colonialism was permanent white settlement based on the dispossession of the Indigenous populations. 
The different colonial objectives in Singapore and Darwin became more obvious following the federation 
of Australia in 1901, at which point Darwin became part of a settler nation rather than a British colony. 
However, as Penny Edwards and Deana Heath have shown, the process of analysing settler and non-
settler colonies side-by-side enables historians to draw broader conclusions about colonialism itself. In 
this case, such a comparison highlights the extent to which the position of coloniser was ambiguous, 
bound up with issues of race and class, and dependent on colonial context. 
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The Transcolonial Politics of Chinese Domestic Mastery in Singapore and Darwin 1910s-1930s 
Claire Lowrie  
University of Newcastle, Australia1  
Introduction 
Feminist and postcolonial scholars have long argued that the home was a microcosm and a symbol 
of the colony. To exercise power in the home, to practice domestic mastery over colonised servants, 
was an expression of colonial power. At the same time, intimate contact and domestic conflicts 
between non-white servants and their employers had the potential to destabilise hierarchical 
distinctions, thereby threatening the stability of colonial rule.2 As Ann Laura Stoler puts it, the home 
was a site where "racial classifications were defined and defied" and where relations between 
coloniser and colonised could sustain or challenge colonial rule.3 The vast majority of the literature 
on the colonial home focuses on European homes and the domestic service relationship as one 
between a white master/mistress and a native servant.4 The 2007 special issue of Frontiers, for 
example, focuses on white-"native" encounters.5 Yet, in many colonial contexts, Asian and 
Indigenous elites employed domestic servants in their homes.6 As Swapna Banerjee has shown in 
her study of Bengal in British India, the relationship of "subordination" in colonial societies was not 
unique to "white masters/mistresses and native/black servants" but crossed class and ethnic lines.7  
This paper rethinks understandings of colonial power and intimacy by analysing domestic service in 
Chinese homes in the neighbouring tropical British colonies of Singapore, in the Straits Settlements, 
and Darwin, in Australia's Northern Territory, from the 1910s to the 1930s. A comparison of this sort 
might, at first glance, seem implausible. Singapore was an exploitation colony where the aim was to 
extract labour and produce. Darwin, on the other hand, was part of a settler colony where the 
intended outcome of colonialism was permanent white settlement based on the dispossession of 
the Indigenous populations.8 The different colonial objectives in Singapore and Darwin became 
more obvious following the federation of Australia in 1901, at which point Darwin became part of a 
settler nation rather than a British colony. However, as Penny Edwards and Deana Heath have 
shown, the process of analysing settler and non-settler colonies side-by-side enables historians to 
draw broader conclusions about colonialism itself.9 In this case, such a comparison highlights the 
extent to which the position of coloniser was ambiguous, bound up with issues of race and class, and 
dependent on colonial context. 
Stoler's work on "poor whites" and mixed-descent individuals in the Dutch East Indies has shown 
how the distinctions between coloniser and colonised changed over time and depended not only 
race but also on "a critical class-based logic."10 The ambiguous position of non-European elites in 
the colonial scheme of things is just as striking. As Kam Louie has argued, far from being "victims" of 
colonialism, Chinese communities exercised colonial power in their own right.11 In Singapore, elite 
members of the China-born and Chinese descended communities collaborated with the British to 
keep the majority population in check.12 In Darwin, while the Chinese experienced racial 
discrimination at the hands of the colonial government, in many ways they behaved as colonisers 
themselves, seeking, as Penny Edwards and Shen Yuanfang write, "to accumulate wealth and 
land."13 As one contributor to the Northern Territory Times put it, the Chinese did not behave as 
colonial subjects but as "Mongolian colonists."14  
The colonial significance of domestic mastery ensured that the capacity of the Chinese to employ 
Chinese and non-Chinese servants in their homes was seen as further evidence of their ambiguous 
place in the colonial hierarchy. In Singapore, illustrations of Chinese mastery had long been admired 
and celebrated by British colonisers. In Darwin, by contrast, the British and Australian-born residents 
resolutely condemned Chinese domestic mastery. The distinct reactions of white colonists in 
Singapore and Darwin reflected the structural differences between settler and exploitation 
colonialism. In Singapore, the ability to extract profits relied on the social stability provided by elite 
Chinese. Thus, illustrations of Chinese wealth and power were seen to solidify British colonial rule. 
Although Darwin was a multi-ethnic town on the edge of Asia, it was nonetheless situated within a 
white settler nation. Here demonstrations of Chinese power were viewed as a direct threat to white 
power and thus to the colonial venture itself. 
The different attitudes toward Chinese mastery came to the fore during the "child rescue" 
campaigns that circulated across the colonial world in the 1920s and 1930s. In both Singapore and 
Darwin, calls for child rescue promoted governmental intervention into Chinese homes. In Darwin, 
the Commonwealth government administration pursued this "civilising mission" with enthusiasm, 
banning the Chinese from employing Aboriginal servants and, in particular, mixed-descent girls. The 
white residents of Darwin condemned the Chinese as corrupt masters and contrasted them with the 
(supposedly) kindly white mistresses who employed Aboriginal domestics in their homes. By denying 
the Chinese the ability to practice domestic mastery and by condemning them as corrupt both the 
government and the public could be assured that that the only genuine and moral colonists were 
white colonists. 
In Singapore, the Straits Settlements government intervened in Chinese affairs reluctantly; 
superficial legislative changes were adopted which ensured that mui tsai (girl slaves) employed in 
Chinese homes at least appeared to be free. Here, British colonists, even those directly involved in 
rescuing mui tsai, were reluctant to condemn the Chinese as corrupt masters. The fact that the 
British in Singapore couched the resolution of the mui tsai problem in terms of child rescue but were 
reluctant to draw the inevitable conclusion that the Chinese were corrupting masters (and that the 
British were by contrast always civilising and good) allowed the British to avoid long-term 
responsibility for Singapore and left open the possibility that respectable middle and upper class 
Chinese were capable of colonial mastery. 
An analysis of Chinese homes in Singapore and Darwin illustrates the importance of considering the 
politics of intimacy and colonial power outside of European homes. Public debate about who was an 
appropriate domestic master, anxiety about Chinese employers of servants, and governmental 
interference in Chinese domestic affairs indicates the validity of analysing these homes as key sites 
of colonial power. Considering Chinese domestic mastery in a settler and an exploitation colony 
highlights the centrality not only of categories of race but also those of class in determining coloniser 
status. In Singapore, class power was central to coloniser status while in Darwin distinctions of race 
were far more important. 
The article begins by examining how a common culture of domestic service developed in Singapore 
and Darwin and how Chinese employers of servants fitted into this culture. The impact of the child 
rescue movement on Chinese homes will then be analysed with a focus on the hesitation of colonial 
authorities to intervene in Chinese homes in Singapore versus the enthusiasm with which 
intervention was pursued in Darwin. The final section of the paper explores how Chinese employers 
were depicted in government documents, newspapers articles, humanitarian reports, memoirs and 
fiction produced by British and Australian colonists. I show how in Singapore, Chinese masters were 
depicted in sympathetic terms while in Darwin they were condemned. My central argument is that 
the different ways child rescue played out in these sites and the different ways Chinese employers 
were represented related to the colonial significance of domestic mastery and the contrasting 
ambitions of settler and exploitation colonialism. 
Colonial Cultures of Domestic Service in Singapore and Darwin 
Singapore and Darwin may have been marked by their different status as exploitation versus settler 
colonies, but there were key similarities between the two sites. Both were established as British 
colonial ports designed to take advantage of the trade routes through Asia to Europe. Singapore 
was, however, far more successful in this regard.15 The two colonies were united by a shared 
tropical climate and similar multiethnic populations, which included a Chinese majority and a much 
smaller European population. In addition to these commonalities, the two sites have a history of 
connection and interaction. Like other colonial port cities, Darwin and Singapore acted as 
"crossroads" or "contact zones" where goods, ideas, cultures and people from the surrounding 
regions mixed and mingled.16 Their connections were forged through steam ships, particularly the 
Burns Philp Line that dominated the route to Singapore, Java, Darwin, Thursday Island, Brisbane and 
Sydney, via the Torres Strait.17 These connections and commonalties resulted in the cultivation of a 
similar tropical colonial culture. Indeed, the white elites of Darwin actively embraced a lifestyle that 
mirrored that of the British in Singapore, donning white plantation suits and solar topees (pith 
helmets), and employing a multiethnic entourage of domestic servants, including Chinese 
"houseboys." 
Darwin, at the northern tip of Australia, was a multi-ethnic society with a small white population. In 
the whole of the Northern Territory in 1910, the 1,200-strong European population was dwarfed by 
3,300 "immigrants" and an estimated 10,000 to 50,000 Aboriginal people. The vast majority of 
immigrants were from China and the dialect groups included Sze Yap, Heung-san and Hakka.18 The 
Chinese community consisted of a small number of businessmen and merchants and a large number 
of labourers. Elite Chinese mixed in European social circles in Darwin and had some influence in the 
community.19 Other immigrant groups represented in the town included Japanese, Filipinos, 
Timorese and "Malays" from other parts of the Indonesian archipelago.20  
The numbers of Chinese in the Northern Territory peaked in 1888 when they outnumbered the 
white population by four to one.21 Though "coloured" labour had long been viewed as essential in 
the tropical northern Australian climate, white colonists, particularly British and Australian 
businessmen and entrepreneurs, were keen to limit Chinese power and influence in the colony. The 
large numbers of Chinese in the Northern Territory was thus cause for concern. In response, in 1888 
the government introduced a poll tax targeting Asian immigrants. Policies of immigration restriction 
were stepped up following the introduction of the white Australia policy in 1901, the cornerstone of 
which was the Immigration Restriction Act.22 In 1911 when the Commonwealth government took 
over the administration of the Northern Territory from South Australia, immigration restriction was 
combined with polices of economic discrimination that sought to replace Chinese with white 
workers. Such policies ensured that many labouring class Chinese either headed south in search of 
work or returned to China. For those who could not afford to go home, the Commonwealth 
government covered the cost of a passage to Hong Kong.23  
Despite government efforts, in 1911 the Chinese still outnumbered the white population, making up 
thirty-two per cent of Darwin's 1,387 residents compared with a white population of twenty-six per 
cent (most of whom were British-born or Australian-born of British extraction).24 Even in 1938, 
Darwin's Chinese population stood at twenty-five per cent but, unlike previous eras when the 
majority of the community was of labouring class origin, the population was largely Australian-born 
and middle class. A significant number were also Australian citizens having been naturalised in the 
years before it was outlawed under section five of the Commonwealth Naturalization Act of 1903. In 
a country supposedly founded on white colonisation, the status of Darwin's Chinese residents as 
Australia-born settlers was a worrying anomaly. 
The population of Darwin was dwarfed by that of the Singapore, which stood at over three hundred 
thousand in 1911. Nonetheless, like Darwin, Singapore's community consisted of a Chinese majority, 
a smaller European population and a mix of other Asian communities, including Malays, Indians, 
Arabs and Eurasians. The European population made up a mere two per cent of the population in 
1911 and was mostly of British extraction. The Chinese majority reached sixty-six per cent in 1891 
and stabilised at seventy-five per cent in 1911.25 It was a community divided by dialect, clan, class 
and citizenship. Hokkiens were the most prominent group in Singapore, followed by Teochews, 
Cantonese, Hakkas and (at the bottom of the social ladder) Hainanese.26 In terms of class, the 
population consisted of merchants (shang), educated elite (shih) and labourers (kung.)27 The 
Chinese community was also divided by citizenship. The Peranakan or Straits Chinese had resided in 
Southeast Asia's port cities for centuries and had married into local Malay communities. The elite of 
the Straits Chinese community spoke English and were British subjects loyal to the crown.28 The 
huaqiao (overseas Chinese) were the larger group in Singapore and were Chinese citizens.29  
The British approach to managing the Chinese population in Singapore was very different to that in 
Darwin. Rather than seeking to confine the Chinese to a subordinate position (and ultimately to 
exclude them altogether), the British in Singapore fostered ethnic and class divisions in order to 
cultivate a close relationship with Chinese elites. From the early colonial days, the Chinese towkays 
(merchants) and the educated elite of the Straits Chinese community played a role in government. 
The Chinese were able to advise the administration, sit on semi-governmental committees, or work 
in the public service. By using the elites as "collaborators," the British sought to keep the Chinese 
majority in check.30  
In terms of the cultural traditions of domestic service, British and white Australian colonists in 
Singapore and Darwin, along with European colonists in other tropical colonies, considered the 
presence of multiple servants in the home essential to managing the ravages of the climate.31 The 
ability to employ large numbers of so-called "coloured" servants was also a viewed as a symbol of 
the power of white colonisers and it was a very necessary indication of power in tropical colonies 
where Europeans were often a minority population.32 In both Singapore and Darwin the domestic 
servant population was large (compared with the colonial metropoles of England and south-eastern 
Australia), multi-ethnic and male-dominated.33 In Singapore, all British colonists were able to 
employ Chinese, Indian or Malay servants, regardless of their class position. As the editor of the 
Straits Times, John Cameron, put it in 1865: "even the ordinary style of living in Singapore may be set 
down as luxurious" by the standards of "home."34 The white residents of Darwin also enjoyed the 
presence of Chinese, Malay and Aboriginal servants, although the numbers of servants was smaller 
than in Singapore. Thus, Charlotte Urquhart, wife of the administrator of the Northern Territory, 
Frederic Urquhart, explained in 1926 that Darwin was "like the East without the East's comforts."35 
Nonetheless, the presence of servants in all white homes in Darwin was in distinct contrast to the 
southeastern areas of Australia such as New South Wales, where in 1901 only nine per cent of the 
population employed any servants at all.36  
White colonists were not the only ones who employed domestic labour. Recalling his childhood in a 
wealthy Hokkien household in Singapore in the 1910s, Low Cheng Gin explained that the family lived 
in what "the English called the aristocratic way" surrounded by numerous servants.37 In Singapore, 
Chinese (particularly from the Hainanese community) and Malay men were employed in Chinese 
homes. In addition, from the 1920s, as the numbers of Chinese female migrants in the colony rose, 
domestic servants called amahs were increasingly used. A significant number of these women were 
maijie or "black and white amahs" who were members of spinster sisterhoods. Mui tsai (girl slaves) 
were also widely employed in Chinese homes.38 In Darwin, the Chinese community employed 
Aboriginal men to work in their homes and businesses. In some cases, mixed-descent girls were also 
employed as nursemaids to Chinese children.39  
The response of white colonists to Chinese domestic mastery in Darwin was in distinct contrast to 
Singapore. While facilitating the arrival of Chinese labourers in the Northern Territory in the 1870s, 
mining entrepreneur John Lewis suggested that the Chinese "should come simply to work for 
Europeans and be servants... they must be treated as a subject race."40 A contributor to the local 
newspaper agreed, maintaining that while Chinese could be employed for "any menial task... the 
concession should stop there."41 In Darwin, the Chinese were to be servants and subordinates 
rather than masters of servants and colonists. In Singapore, Chinese wealth and power was admired 
rather than feared. Thus, in 1839 Howard Malcolm, an American missionary in Singapore, 
maintained that the numerous servants in Chinese homes "testified the high claim of the Chinese to 
the character of a civilized people."42 C.D. Mackellar, a British visitor to Singapore in 1901, saw it in 
similar terms, claiming to "admire" the "fat, rich-looking Chinese" with his Malay servants.43  
The different responses of white colonists to the elite Chinese in Darwin and Singapore reflected the 
very different trajectories of the two colonies. The intention for Darwin was that it would one day be 
a member of a white settler nation. Evidence of Chinese wealth and influence, particularly in the 
context of a significant Australian-born Chinese population, was highly problematic. In contrast, 
Singapore was intended to remain an exploitation colony, a site from which profits could be shipped 
back to the metropole. Here, the wealth and influence of Chinese elites, in the context of a majority 
Chinese population, stabilised a colonial order based on distinctions of race and class. The different 
attitudes towards Chinese domestic mastery in Darwin and Singapore came to the fore during the 
transcolonial child rescue movement of the interwar years. 
The Politics of Child Rescue in Chinese Homes 
The period following World War I marked a time of humanitarian critique in the colonial world. 
Feminists, Christians and philanthropists condemned what they saw as systemic slavery and 
exploitation, and actively lobbied colonial governments to protect the welfare of colonised subjects, 
especially women and children. One key manifestation of this climate of humanitarianism is what 
Shurlee Swain has referred to as the "transcolonial child rescue movement."44 In sites as diverse as 
Australia, the Dutch East Indies, North America, French Indochina and British Burma, notions of 
rescuing children from "inadequate parenting" or the "corrupting influence" of class and racial 
"others" justified the removal of children from their homes or places of work. The traditions of child 
rescue drew on campaigns that targeted working class children in Britain during the nineteenth 
century. The rescued children were institutionalised at the behest of colonial governments and 
educated to a level considered consistent with class and racial categories. In all cases, new ideas 
about white women's domesticating, civilising and maternal capabilities ensured that they were 
allocated an active role in child rescue.45  
In Darwin and Singapore, calls for child rescue and the government intervention that resulted 
targeted domestic servants employed in Chinese homes. In both sites, colonial administrators were 
implored to rescue servants from conditions of slavery, physical and sexual abuse and opium 
addiction. In Singapore, these kinds of claims emerged in response to the mui tsai practice. In 
Darwin, claims of corruption were directed at Chinese employers of Aboriginal people, particularly 
mixed-descent girls. By adopting the child rescue platform, the governments of Singapore and 
Darwin were able to uphold a public image of moral legitimacy at a time of intense criticism. The 
results of the interventions were, however, very different, reflecting the distinct colonial objectives 
of exploitation and settler colonialism. 
In Singapore claims of slavery resulted in the Straits Settlements government regulating and 
eventually prohibiting the mui tsai system. The mui tsai practice was an established Chinese 
tradition that involved poor families in southern China and parts of Malaya selling their daughters 
into servitude. Significant numbers of these girls ended up working for Chinese families in Hong 
Kong, Malaya and Singapore.46 In 1922, it was estimated that between seven thousand and ten 
thousand mui tsai were working in Chinese homes in Singapore. In her 1937 "Minority Report," 
activist and government representative, Edith Picton-Tubervill maintained, "every Chinese 
household that could afford to had a mui tsai."47 A test sample of one hundred mui tsai in 1930 
showed that most worked in the homes of Teochew shopkeepers. They ranged in age from 6 to 
thirteen, and on reaching puberty, the girls were married off or became concubines.48  
The mui tsai system had been subject to criticism as early as the turn of the century. By the 1920s, 
the occasional criticisms had turned into an international humanitarian campaign, prominent in Asia, 
Britain, the United States and Australia. International organisations, including the League of Nations 
slavery committees, the British Aborigines Protection League and various missionary organisations in 
China labelled the practice child slavery and called for its abolition.49 Within the Chinese 
community, there were differing opinions about the status of mui tsai. Some Chinese elites in Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Malaya certainly maintained that the mui tsai were slaves and sought to abolish 
the system. Others, however, defended the practice. As early as 1898, unofficial legislative council 
member, Lim Boom Keng (under the pen name Lin Meng Cheng), argued in Singapore's well-
respected Straits Chinese Magazine that becoming a mui tsai saved Chinese girls from lives of 
poverty and misery in China and that for the most part they were well treated.50 These kinds of 
arguments were repeated in the 1920s and 1930s with elite Chinese families in Singapore and Hong 
Kong maintaining that the mui tsai were more like "adopted daughter[s]" or "sisters" than 
"slaves."51 The different opinions amongst the Chinese community are not surprising considering 
the diversity of the population. 
In Singapore, and in Hong Kong where the mui tsai debate first emerged, colonial authorities were 
reluctant to intervene in Chinese domestic affairs. In the context of a Chinese majority that was 
partly kept in check through collaboration with Chinese elites, outright condemnation and 
intervention into Chinese domestic affairs risked destabilising the colony. Accusations of slavery, 
however, could not be ignored. Since abolition in 1833, opposition to slavery had afforded British 
"moral superiority," and evidence of slavery operating in British colonies, in Eric Tagliacozzo's words, 
"made a mockery of the ostensible civilising mission."52 Hong Kong's South China Morning Post 
highlighted the connection between the mui tsai system and the reputation of British imperial rule in 
1930: "It is absolutely necessary that we should be freed from the accusation of slavery. As a British 
colony it is unthinkable that we should continue the system as at present."53 The best way for 
officials to maintain a position of moral superiority and colonial legitimacy was to embrace the child 
rescue platform. 
The first piece of legislation which sought to regulate the mui tsai practice in Singapore was the 1925 
Female Domestic Servants Law which was designed, according to the "Protector" of Chinese, Victor 
Purcell, "to safeguard the moral and material interests of Chinese girls" by making it an offence to 
employ a mui tsai less than 10 years of age. The law was, however, completely ineffective as it was 
impossible to determine the exact age of the child.54 The Straits Settlements government made a 
more serious attempt to intervene in the mui tsai system with the 1933 Mui Tsai Ordinance, which 
was administered by the Chinese Protectorate. The ordinance demanded the registration of all 
existing mui tsai, the payment of a small wage of 1 to 3 dollars per month, and regular inspections of 
their working conditions. Mui tsai who were considered to be in danger of abuse could be removed 
from their employer's home and sent to the Po Leung Kuk, a refuge opened in 1878.55  
The Chinese Protectorate's European lady inspectors, shadowed by Chinese assistant protectors, 
were charged with the task of visiting Chinese homes where they knew mui tsai to be employed. 
True to the civilising role they were entrusted with in other colonial contexts, these women were 
depicted as substitute mothers to the mui tsai and at least some white women saw themselves in 
this light.56 This perception of their role was no doubt enhanced by the knowledge that the mui tsai 
had been given up by their biological mothers. In Singapore, former mui tsai Janet Lim recalled that a 
European lady inspector, Mrs. Winter, visited her workplace and told her "to let her know if we were 
badly treated." Lim continued: "she told us to think of her as a mother."57 To Lim's profound 
disappointment, however, this did not mean that Mrs. Winter would take her home and treat her as 
a daughter. Instead, after running away from her employer, Lim was sent to the Po Leung Kuk. 
The Po Leung Kuk was used to rehabilitate and "civilise" mui tsai who had been removed from their 
employers or who had run away. It was hoped training in domestic work would help the girls find 
suitable employment as domestic servants in upper and middle class Chinese and European homes 
and ultimately make them into respectable women worthy of marriage.58 The reports from the Po 
Leung Kuk are testament to the idealised process of transformation: "Of the three admitted to the 
Po Leung Kuk one was reported by her employer as unmanageable... She was admitted... in January 
and by October had won the Mabel Winter Shield for good conduct. Soon afterwards employment 
was found for her as a domestic servant in a respectable family."59 Further action was taken with 
the commissioning of a report on the mui tsai in 1937. The "Majority Report" argued that, as most 
mui tsai now worked for their employers as free servants and were generally well cared for, outright 
removal of all mui tsai was unnecessary. However, in contrast to the "Majority Report," Picton-
Turbervill's "Minority Report" maintained that the system and its abuses were ongoing and urged 
further action. The government took action with the Straits Settlements Children's Ordinance of 
1938-1940. However, the outbreak of World War II ensured it was never instituted.60  
The public condemnation of the mui tsai practice and growing governmental interference made the 
prospect of employing mui tsai inconvenient and played a part in the growing popularity of free 
Chinese amahs from the late 1920s.61 However, neither the Domestic Service Law (1925) nor the 
Mui Tsai Ordinance (1933) ended mui tsai practice. Instead, the laws drove the system underground, 
with owners disguising their mui tsai as family members or simply refusing to register them—the 
favoured response of Lucy Lum's grandmother in Singapore in the 1930s.62 Even when Chinese 
employers followed the regulations and paid the required wage, the payment for the work was set 
at far below the minimum wage.63 In any case, as Purcell later admitted, the intention of the 1933 
ordinance was not to end the mui tsai practice but to protect the reputation of the empire by 
resolving the accusation of slavery operating in the colony.64 Setting a compulsory monthly wage 
ensured that mui tsai at least appeared to be free domestic workers. 
The government approach to the mui tsai sought to recreate the nineteenth century British tradition 
of domestic apprenticeship whereby working class families sent their children into service as a 
means of ensuring they were fed and clothed. The middle and upper class recipients of these child 
servants not only derived benefit from their service but took comfort in the belief that they were 
civilising working class families and destitute children.65 The influence of these English ideas can be 
seen in an editorial in Hong Kong's South China Morning Post where it was suggested that a means 
of overcoming the exploitation of mui tsai lay in dropping the name and cultivating an attitude 
toward the girl as a "sort of daughter" and a "servant in training."66  
By making superficial changes to transform the system into a form of domestic apprenticeship, the 
Straits Settlements government sought to silence claims of slavery while avoiding offending the elite 
Chinese on whom colonial power in part rested. By recasting the image of the girl slave into a 
domestic apprentice, by mobilising white women as protectors and by creating a place of 
rehabilitation, the Straits Settlements government presented itself as an agent of child rescue. But 
while in Singapore the government intervention into Chinese homes was tokenistic, in Darwin it was 
pursued enthusiastically. 
The Commonwealth government takeover of the Northern Territory in 1911 saw the 
implementation of policies designed to incorporate the northern frontier into the white Australian 
nation.67 The multiethnic north presented a major challenge to "white" Australia. Immigration 
restrictions allowed the government to curtail nonwhite settlement, but the Indigenous populations, 
though increasingly displaced from their traditional lands, remained at the fringes of settler society. 
Government officials comforted themselves with the belief that "full-blood" Aboriginal people were 
a "dying race," but they could not dismiss the growing mixed-descent population so easily. In the 
early years of Port Darwin or Palmerston, as it was originally called, white, Asian and Aboriginal 
communities were able to mix with relative freedom and as a result, an ethnically mixed population 
developed. The "half-caste problem" was widely accepted as a major obstacle to the achievement of 
a white Australia.68  
In Darwin, the Commonwealth government sought to deal with this "problem" through child 
removal and racial segregation. Aboriginal children considered to be of a "pale shade" were 
removed from their families and communities. The mixed-descent boys were trained as manual 
labourers, often as stock workers, while most girls were recruited as domestic servants for white 
families.69 At the same time, Aboriginal people were banned from Chinatown; schools were 
segregated according to race and so-called "Asiatics" were banned from employing Aboriginal 
people.70 Such policies were pursued under the guise of Aboriginal protection and child rescue. 
The South Australian government's Aborigines Act of 1910 first banned the Chinese community in 
Darwin from employing Aboriginal servants. The act put in place a system of protectors headed by a 
chief protector who was responsible for the movements, employment and wages of Aboriginal 
people. Aboriginal reserves were established and the chief protector was invested with the power to 
remove Aboriginal people there. Potential white employers had to apply for an annual license to 
employ Aboriginal workers, while the Chinese were barred from receiving a license. The Aborigines 
Act was modelled on Queensland's 1901 amendment to the Aboriginals Protection and Restriction of 
the Sale of Opium Act (1897) and Western Australia's Aborigines Act of 1905. In all cases, the key 
concern was to stem interracial contact by prohibiting Asians (especially the Chinese) from 
employing Aboriginal people and cohabiting with them.71  
The 1910 Act was reinforced in the 1911 Aboriginals Ordinance, passed under the Commonwealth 
administration. The Commonwealth instituted another Aboriginals Ordinance in 1918, which 
formalised the system of removal of children, targeting mixed-descent females in particular, and 
attempted to regulate the conditions of their employment within white homes.72 As with the 1911 
version, it stipulated that: "No licence to employ aboriginals shall be granted to any male person of 
any Asiatic race." In later years, the Chinese were given approval to employ Aboriginal men but were 
still prohibited from employing Aboriginal and mixed-descent women and girls. This illustrates that 
fears of miscegenation remained.73  
Even before the passing of the 1910 act and the ordinances of 1911 and 1918, the children of 
Chinese fathers and Aboriginal mothers were targeted for removal as a matter of policy. This was 
also the case in neighbouring Queensland, where the children of Chinese and Aboriginal parents 
were automatically regarded as ill cared for.74 Such attitudes are resonant with those of colonial 
administrators in the Dutch East Indies where the refusal of native mothers to give up their mixed-
descent children was portrayed as an act of neglect.75 Aboriginal servants in Chinese homes were 
also targeted for removal before the official legislation was passed. This was especially the case if 
the servant in question was a mixed-descent girl. 
In 1898 the inspector of police and protector of aborigines, Paul Foelsche called for the removal of a 
mixed-descent girl, Polly, from the home of Harry Sue Lee where she was employed as a nursemaid. 
Lee's status as a merchant gave him the confidence to question the decision and prompted the 
government to make enquiries. However, Lee's class status did not ensure a favourable outcome. 
The claim that Polly was in a relationship with one of Lee's Chinese employees was seen to justify 
her removal from the home and her recruitment into service for the government.76 The targeting of 
mixed-descent girls for removal was by no means unusual in colonial societies. In British Burma and 
French Indochina notions of "rescuing" mixed-descent girls from their dangerous environments, the 
"cultural affiliations of their native mothers" and their perceived potential for promiscuity were 
common and often resulted in child removal.77  
The Chinese community responded to this overt discrimination by petitioning the administrator of 
the Northern Territory and the Commonwealth minister for external affairs in 1911 and again in 
1912. Seven Chinese storekeepers and tradesmen pleaded with the government in 1911: "Many of 
us have had blackboys in our employ for years and have always treated them well and the boys do 
not want to leave us. This will work [sic] great hardship on us." They pointed out that most of the 
community had lived in Darwin for many years and made an important contribution to the 
economy.78 In 1912, eleven Chinese businessmen reiterated their concerns through a second 
petition and provided examples of the forced closure of Chinese businesses due to the loss of 
Aboriginal labour.79 Their complaints failed to move a government deeply committed to achieving a 
white Australia through racial segregation. 
The anthropologist Baldwin Spencer was appointed chief protector of Aboriginals by the 
Commonwealth administration in 1912. Following Spencer's report and recommendations, 
Aboriginal people from Darwin and the surrounding regions were confined to the Kahlin Compound, 
which was opened in 1913. There was a separate fenced compound called the Kahlin Half-Caste Girls 
Home where mixed-descent girls were sent. As with the Po Leung Kuk in Singapore, Kahlin Half-Caste 
Girls Home was seen as a place where they could be uplifted. Thus, Hilda Muir was told she was in 
Kahlin "to be civilised."80 The ultimate ambition in the Kahlin Half-Caste home was to create women 
worthy of marriage or servitude in respectable homes. This ambition was one shared with 
Singapore's Po Leung Kuk. However, in the Po Leung Kuk the aim was merely the achievement of 
middle class respectability while in Darwin the intention was one of assimilating mixed-descent 
Aboriginal girls into white society in an effort to "effect the disappearance of the race."81  
The differences in the desired outcomes of child rescue in Singapore and Darwin are striking. They 
can be understood in the context of the distinct aims of exploitation and settler colonialism. 
Comparing child rescue in North America to the Dutch East Indies, Stoler argues that the intention of 
achieving white settlement in America (rather than merely extracting labour and produce) ensured 
that the removal, institutionalisation and schooling of Native American girls was designed "to 
obliterate an entire culture."82 In Darwin by the 1930s, child rescue targeting mixed-descent girls 
was directed at eugenic assimilation. C.E. Cook, chief protector of Aboriginals and chief medical 
officer in the Northern Territory from 1927, was a particular champion of this approach. While 
Spencer had advocated mere segregation for the mixed-descent community, Cook's ambition was 
that mixed-descent girls in service would marry working class white men and ultimately breed out 
colour.83  
In Singapore, the child rescue movement ensured that some mui tsai were removed from conditions 
of slavery. In Darwin, the same rhetoric resulted in mixed-descent children being systematically 
removed from their families, communities or places of employment and forced to work in white 
homes. In theory, Aboriginal girls in Darwin received some remuneration for their work as domestics 
in white homes. However, it was held in a government trust, did not reflect the hours of labour 
performed and they often never received the money at all.84 Similarly to Singapore, government 
officials framed this system of virtual slavery as a domestic apprenticeship. As Victoria Haskins puts 
it, the nineteenth century methods of dealing with girls from the "dangerous classes" in England by 
forcing the children of the poor into domestic "apprenticeship" for which they received little or no 
wage were adapted to "solve" the Aboriginal "problem."85 All the Australian states implemented 
the forcible removal of Aboriginal children with this in view.86  
In contrast to Singapore, in Darwin humanitarian criticism generally focused on the increased 
government interventions into the lives of colonised people rather than the lack of it. Within 
Australia, direct criticism of the policies of Aboriginal protection was rare but not completely 
unheard of. Mary Montgomery Bennett, a feminist and mission teacher from Western Australia, 
described the conditions of Aboriginal employment in white homes as "analogous to slavery" and 
criticised the policy of removing Aboriginal children from their families and communities.87 The 
media in Britain and Europe agreed, labelling the licensing system that controlled the use of 
Aboriginal labour, as one of "slave certificates."88  
Even those who supported the policy of Aboriginal child removal, such as the Women's Non-Party 
Association of South Australia, expressed concerns about the sexual vulnerability of Aboriginal girls 
in white homes and called for the appointment of female inspectors.89 In lobbying for female 
inspectors, these groups were drawing on traditions in other British colonies, such as Singapore, 
where female inspectors were appointed to protect the mui tsai in Chinese homes. Not surprisingly, 
the Australian authorities resisted such requests. As Fiona Paisley has explained, to employ female 
protectors to inspect white homes was to admit that: "white men were the problem on the 
frontier." In the Northern Territory, the government was much more inclined to blame the sexual 
abuse of Aboriginal girls on Chinese men and the supposedly "lustful half-caste females" 
themselves.90  
In Darwin (unlike Singapore) the humanitarian criticisms did little to alter government policy. While 
claims of exploitation of Aboriginal people caused some embarrassment and discomfort on the 
international stage, the government was more concerned with the future white nation. The decision 
to ban the Chinese from employing Aboriginal labour was part of a broader policy of segregation 
designed to stem to the growing numbers of mixed-descent individuals in order to turn the multi-
ethic north into a member of the white Australian community. The fact that the government had 
mobilised the rhetoric and practices of child rescue from the very beginning of its intervention 
meant that it was resilient to the criticisms of humanitarians and was able to respond to the protests 
of groups, such as the Chinese, by claiming a moral high ground. 
It was not just governmental intervention into Chinese homes that played out in different ways in 
Darwin and Singapore. In memoirs, newspaper articles, government documents and humanitarian 
reports, upper and middle class white colonists in these sites depicted the Chinese in very different 
ways. The distinct colonial representations in the two sites related to the political significance of 
domestic mastery and reflected the different role the Chinese were allocated in colonial Darwin and 
Singapore. 
British and White Australian Reponses to Chinese Mastery: Corrupting or kindly? 
At the heart of the child rescue rhetoric was the notion of the long-term corrupting effects of bad 
influences. As it was Chinese homes that were targeted for intervention, the implication was that 
the Chinese were corrupting masters. In Singapore, even humanitarians working to rescue mui tsai 
were reluctant to condemn the Chinese as corrupt masters. In contrast, in Darwin the discourse of 
the corrupting Chinese master was mobilised with conviction and contrasted with its "natural" 
opposite—the kindly white mistress. The discourse of the corrupting Chinese master (not to mention 
the kindly white mistress) had very little to do with what actually went on within colonial homes. 
Indeed, both the mui tsai employed in Chinese homes in Singapore and the mixed-descent girls 
employed in white homes in Darwin, considered themselves slaves. For European colonisers, to be a 
good and worthy domestic master was to be a good and worthy coloniser. Thus, to accept that the 
Chinese could be good domestic masters was to infer that they had the potential to be legitimate 
colonisers. In Singapore, the British were (relatively) willing to accept that upper and middle class 
Chinese were capable of colonial mastery while in Darwin the white community could not accept 
such a possibility. 
The image of the corrupting Chinese master had a history in both Singapore and Darwin. In both 
sites, white colonists expressed concerns about Chinese employers who were addicted to opium, 
practiced slavery and assaulted their servants, physically as well as sexually. In Hugh Clifford's 1913 
Malayan short story "Two Little Slave Girls," for example, Malay sisters escape a Chinese master and 
flee to "the white folk" to be liberated from "slavery, for the white man will not suffer it."91 By 
rejecting slavery and rescuing the children, Clifford asserted that the British in Malaya were moral 
and worthy rulers. When it came to the mui tsai controversy, however, the Straits Settlements 
government and its representatives were hesitant to mobilise this discourse. Unlike Clifford's 
Malayan story, the claim of protecting an Indigenous population from the exploitation of colonial 
migrants was not a factor. There were different issues at stake. 
This is not to suggest that the discourse of the corrupting Chinese master did not circulate in the 
colony at all. As Susan Pederson argues in Hong Kong, in the eyes of many white feminists, Chinese 
men could not help but enslave young girls and as a result public debate focused on the abuse 
(particularly sexual abuse) of mui tsai by Chinese men. Likewise, Sarah Paddle discusses western 
feminist ideas about the "immoral Chinese man" buying and selling girls in China.92 There is also 
evidence that such concerns played out in Singapore. In her 1937 "Minority Report," Picton-
Turbervill argued that the sexual abuse of mui tsai was common due to the notions of ownership 
that ensured that "the purchaser" feels "he has a possession with which he can do as he pleases."93 
While the government in Singapore may not have publically admitted it, the perceived need for 
female inspectors to protect mui tsai in Chinese homes also alludes to such fears. 
Chinese masters might have been more prevalent in the public debate about sexual abuse, but 
Chinese mistresses also came under criticism. In both Singapore and Hong Kong stories of "callous 
mistress[es]" violently abusing mui tsai featured in the local European newspapers.94 In general, 
however, the response of the British was measured, especially considering the exploitive nature of 
the mui tsai system and the fact that in other contexts (such as Darwin) the Chinese were 
condemned for far lesser actions. 
The British in Singapore were swayed by the arguments made by Chinese employers that the mui 
tsai were treated as family members rather than slaves and were rarely abused. Thus, Victor Purcell 
accepted that "the mui tsai was a member of the family whereas a paid domestic servant was not" 
and that as a result mui tsai were better off and rarely subjected to abuse.95 Even those involved in 
the rescue of mui tsai demonstrated cultural sensitivity in their depiction of Chinese masters. Lucia 
Bach, who was involved in the care of abused mui tsai in the 1920s and 1930s, maintained that "very 
often" becoming a mui tsai gave Chinese girls "a better chance in life."96 In her "Minority Report," 
Picton-Turbervill conceded: "there has been in England a tendency to exaggerate the extent of the 
evil... on the whole the community is law-abiding."97 What these humanitarian and government 
perspectives have in common is a measured, thoughtful and (relatively) culturally sensitive approach 
to the mui tsai question. They do not mobilise the discourse of the corrupting Chinese master to 
condemn the entire Chinese population. 
While government representatives might have comforted themselves with the notion that mui tsai 
were family members rather than slaves, the mui tsai themselves remember their experience 
unequivocally as a case of slavery. Janet Lim, for example, forcefully recounts her experience in 
Singapore: "It is very difficult for people to understand what it means to be a slave, to be bargained 
for and sold like merchandise, to suffer shame and the whips of one's master and mistress."98 In any 
case, as studies of both contemporary and historical domestic service have shown, the idea of 
domestic workers as "part of the family" does not ensure favourable treatment.99 Notions of 
ownership based on family ties or slavery gave employers unparalleled power over mui tsai. Some 
mui tsai were well treated. Nonetheless, abuse and exploitation certainly took place. Picton-
Turbervill was quite right in maintaining that it was the system that was the problem.100  
As Paddle has argued, the cultural sensitivity displayed by the British in Asia can be understood in 
the context of a western feminist movement that was increasingly "internationalist and racially 
aware."101 For the colonial government in Singapore, however, the display of cultural sensitivity 
also had a practical purpose. The reluctance of the British to employ the discourse of the corrupting 
Chinese master, despite the evidence of abuse, needs to be read in the context of a majority Chinese 
population and a Chinese elite with close ties to the government. As Souchou Yao puts it, the "social 
and economic realities" of life in Singapore ensured that European prejudice toward the Chinese was 
"highly selective" and dependent on class.102 In Singapore, the "respectable" master was of 
necessity defined by class rather than based on race. 
Furthermore, labelling the Chinese "corrupting masters" would have been a risky strategy in the 
context of exploitation colonialism. Considering the symbolic significance of domestic mastery, to 
exclude the Chinese from the status of respectable mastery was to exclude them from coloniser 
status. This would allocate the British a long-term moral responsibility for the colony, a situation that 
was not consistent with their colonial objectives. As the acting secretary of the Straits Settlements, 
Hayes Marriott, explained in 1921, it was the Chinese, Indians and Malays who "look upon this 
Settlement as their home" and who would "form a permanent population" in Singapore.103 The 
cultural sensitivity displayed by the British in Singapore was in their own best interests, providing a 
means to maintain colonial stability and business as usual. 
In contrast to the display of cultural sensitivity of British colonists in Singapore, in Darwin many 
middle class white colonists who wrote to the press or recorded their memoirs, as well as 
government representatives, depicted the Chinese as corrupters. In Singapore it was in the 
government's interest to avoid alienating the Chinese population; in Darwin the interests of the 
Commonwealth administration were exactly the opposite. By the 1920s, the Chinese residents of 
Darwin were, for the most part, born in Australia. In the context of white Australia, the government 
needed a means to deny these Australian-born residents a legitimate place in the north. One 
solution lay in condemning Chinese domestic mastery and elevating white domestic mastery. Thus, 
chief protector of Aboriginals, Baldwin Spencer, enforced the ban on Chinese employment of 
Aboriginal people with enthusiasm, claiming in 1912 that, because of the Chinese love of opium and 
alcohol: "Nothing is more patent than the rapid degeneration of the native in contact with the 
Chinese."104  
White residents often reproduced the justifications of the government verbatim. In the 1920s, a 
letter to the editor of Darwin's Northern Standard claimed that in some parts of the Northern 
Territory "Chinese are allowed to work" Aboriginal people and as a result, "they have an open go at 
opium." The notion that all Chinese were corrupters and exploiters was also fuelled by reports of the 
mui tsai system and other forms of slavery operating within China that were published in the same 
newspaper.105 Unlike in Singapore, the corrupting Chinese master was always portrayed as a male 
(probably because of the lower proportion of Chinese women in Darwin compared with Singapore) 
and as a potential sexual threat to Aboriginal women.106  
There is evidence that Chinese men exploited Aboriginal people. Opium smoking was prevalent 
among the Chinese community and oral history accounts suggest that Chinese men supplied the 
drug to Aboriginal people. There are also accounts of violent abuse.107 It is likely that Chinese men 
used Aboriginal women for sex in conditions that were exploitative. However, white employers were 
also known for supplying their Aboriginal workers with alcohol and opium and for sexually exploiting 
Aboriginal women. As Ann McGrath has shown, Chinese and white men sought formal and informal 
marriages with Aboriginal women and had sexual relationships with them that were exploitive or 
mutually beneficial.108 By depicting Chinese men as corrupters, white colonists obscured their own 
abuse, exploitation and dispossession of Aboriginal people. Blaming the Chinese for the abuse of 
Aboriginal Australians allowed white colonists to depict themselves as benevolent protectors and to 
present the colonial venture as a moral one. 
Not all the white residents of Darwin accepted whole-heartedly the discourse of the corrupting 
Chinese master. In 1911, a group of 7 prominent Chinese businessmen acknowledged "a debt of 
gratitude to our European fellow townsmen" for their expressions of sympathy in regards to their 
treatment by the Commonwealth government.109 S.J. Mitchell, the acting administrator of the 
Northern Territory at the time of the Commonwealth takeover, argued against the ban on Chinese 
employers, maintaining that some Chinese employers treated their Aboriginal employees well. 
When a second petition was sent to Spencer in 1912 to protest the prohibition placed on Chinese 
employment of Aboriginal people, twenty-seven prominent white residents signed it. Challenging 
the view of the Chinese as corrupting and degrading masters, their solicitor argued that they were 
"as fit as the average European to employ natives."110 The government, however, refused to 
reconsider the ban. In stark contrast to Singapore, in Darwin notions of race and fears of 
miscegenation meant that even respectable middle class Chinese were seen as unworthy of 
domestic help in the form of Aboriginal servants. This was the antithesis of white Australia and 
would signal the doom of the colonial venture. 
The discourse of the corrupting Chinese master was not only mobilised with conviction in Darwin, it 
was contrasted with its "natural" opposite—what Haskins describes as the transcolonial image of 
"the kindly mistress."111 In contrast to the experience of deprivation that Aboriginal people had 
supposedly experienced in Chinese homes (and would again if the legislation was changed), it was 
claimed mixed-descent girls working in white homes under white women experienced maternal 
care. J.W. Bleakley, protector of Aborigines in Queensland, captured the general view when he 
suggested that by working as domestic servants, Aboriginal girls obtained "a good home" in which 
the white mistress would provide "motherly care and domestic training."112  
The image of the bad Chinese master and the good white mistress is observable in Jeanie Gunn's 
1908 memoir of her year in the Northern Territory. According to Gunn, Cheon, her Chinese cook, 
suggested that she "buy a little Chinese maiden to wait on the missus." In response, Gunn informed 
Cheon of "the abolition of slavery throughout the Empire." Even so, he argued for "buying the 
treasure and saying nothing about it to the Governor."113 Instead, Gunn acquired an Aboriginal girl, 
Rosy. In the case of Rosy, there is no suggestion of slavery. This account shows the reach of the anti-
mui tsai campaign, but the emphasis on Chinese slavery is significant for another reason. John 
Fitzgerald has argued that claims of Chinese slavery were used to justify the exclusion of the Chinese 
from a supposedly egalitarian white Australian nation.114 Gunn's account is a good example of the 
attempted exclusion of the Chinese from the white nation based on inherent Chinese corruption and 
white morality. 
In Darwin, government rhetoric emphasised that the kindly white mistress should be like a mother 
to her Aboriginal ward. However, in a context in which interracial intimacy was in some instances 
illegal and considered immoral, the white population of Darwin was more likely to treat Aboriginal 
servants as "distant companions" than as daughters. This was, after all, common practice in other 
European tropical colonies such as British Rhodesia and Singapore.115 Some white women did 
genuinely care for the mixed-descent girls working in their homes. However, in white homes in 
Darwin (as in Chinese homes in Singapore), the potential for abuse was fuelled by notions of familial 
relationships and ownership. 
Many of the Aboriginal women who worked as domestic servants describe their experience as one 
of slavery.116 As with mui tsai, mixed-descent girls in service were vulnerable to sexual and physical 
abuse by their employers.117 These girls, like the mui tsai, were subject to the will and power of 
their masters and had little chance for redress.118 Even in cases where Aboriginal girls were "well 
looked after" and "never worked," they did not necessarily feel part of the family. Thus, Dolly 
Bonson remembers her experience living in a white home in Darwin in the 1930s, explaining she was 
there to "look after them two little girls" rather than being reared as a daughter herself.119  
In Darwin, the dual discourse of the corrupting Chinese master and the kindly white mistress was 
mobilised despite the evidence that the system of Aboriginal apprenticeships involved systematic 
abuse. The use of this discourse was essential to manage fears and anxieties about white colonial 
legitimacy and the future of the north. The intention of incorporating Darwin into the white nation 
ensured that the Commonwealth government, and a significant number of white residents, could 
not risk displaying cultural sensitivity when it came to the Chinese community. The Chinese needed 
to be resolutely excluded from coloniser status. In a context in which the Chinese community was 
Australian-born and permanently settled, this discourse asserted that they did not belong and would 
never belong in a white egalitarian nation, while the presence of white people was righteous and 
moral. 
Conclusion 
The transcolonial child rescue movement of the interwar years had a significant impact on Chinese 
homes in Darwin and Singapore. In Darwin, governmental intervention into Chinese homes ensured 
that the entire Chinese community lost their ability to employ Aboriginal servants. At the same time, 
Aboriginal girls were removed from their families and communities and forced to work in white 
homes. In Darwin, most government representatives and many white middle class commentators 
mobilised the discourse of the corrupting Chinese master with conviction, contrasting this image 
with that of the kindly white mistress. The contention that the experience of Aboriginal servants in 
Chinese homes had been one of deprivation, while in white homes mixed-descent girls experienced 
kindly maternal care, was upheld despite the evidence that the conditions of employment in white 
homes rested on ideas of ownership that in some cases fostered abuse. 
In Singapore, the child rescue platform resulted in some mui tsai being removed from conditions of 
forced domestic labour. Here only those households that opted to obey the easily defied laws lost 
their ability to employ servants. Those middle and upper class Chinese households who could afford 
to turned to waged domestic servants, such as amahs, for their domestic service needs. While the 
government in Singapore used the rhetoric of child rescue to silence international critics, there was a 
hesitation to condemn Chinese employers despite the evidence of systemic abuse of mui tsai. The 
colonial government and its agents were careful to point out that, though the mui tsai system was 
somewhat repugnant, only a minority of Chinese employers were corrupting masters. 
While the rhetorical manifestations and practical effects of child rescue seem entirely different, in 
both Darwin and Singapore the child rescue movement allowed colonial administrators to combat 
humanitarian criticism while continuing to pursue their distinct colonial objectives. The different 
responses to Chinese employers of servants in Darwin and Singapore need to be considered in light 
of the colonial significance of domestic mastery. Domestic mastery was a symbol and an expression 
of colonial mastery. Thus, the ability of the Chinese to employ servants based on their class position 
potentially conferred to them coloniser status. 
The hesitation with which the discourse of the corrupting Chinese master was used in Singapore, 
demonstrates that the colonial mastery of the elite Chinese was relatively acceptable. The British 
were unwilling to condemn the wealthy merchants or Straits Chinese with whom the administration 
had close ties and relied on for colonial stability. Furthermore, the British were not prepared to 
accept the inevitable consequences of condemning Chinese mastery. To condemn Chinese mastery 
inferred that the British were the only worthy and moral masters. Such an assertion would make the 
British entirely responsible for the colony and would tie them to it forever. In the context of 
exploitation colonialism, this was unacceptable. 
In contrast to Singapore, in Darwin any threat to the idea that coloniser status was determined by 
whiteness brought into question the entire colonial project. The discourse of the corrupting Chinese 
master, particularly when contrasted with the kindly white mistress, demonstrated that though the 
Chinese could afford to employ servants (and had done so the past), the way they exercised this 
power excluded them from coloniser status. Here, the unflinching adherence to the idea that the 
Chinese were corrupt masters was a means to resolve anxiety about the small but significant 
numbers of Australian-born, permanent Chinese settlers and the concern that Darwin, a multiethnic 
colony on the edge of Asia, would never be part of the white settler nation. In Singapore, anxiety 
about colonial stability and the future of the colony was evoked by the mobilisation of the discourse 
of the corrupting Chinese master. In Darwin, colonial stability and national destiny rested on its 
unquestioned assertion. 
A study of Chinese domestic affairs in Darwin and Singapore during the interwar years illustrates the 
value of analysing non-European homes in order to understand the transcolonial politics of intimacy. 
Debate within white colonial society about who was an appropriate domestic master, anxiety about 
what went on inside Chinese homes and government intervention into these homes illustrates that 
colonial power was just as invested in Chinese homes as it was in white homes. Moreover, analysing 
the politics of intimacy in Chinese homes illustrates the degree to which the status of coloniser was 
ambiguous, contested and dependent on colonial context. In the case of exploitation colonialism in 
Singapore, class power was central to coloniser status while in Darwin, race distinctions were far 
more important in determining who was a settler and a coloniser. 
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